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Article 
Proportionality, Privacy, and Public 
Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire 
Christopher Slobogin† 
In 2007, I published Privacy at Risk: The New Government 
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment.1 The immediate trig-
ger for the book was the recent upsurge in government use of 
technology to monitor public and private behavior, and more 
particularly the tremendous increase in government surveil-
lance after 9/11 using techniques such as data mining, phone 
and computer intercepts, and public camera systems. The pri-
mary analytical target of the book, however, was more general: 
Supreme Court case law that, read broadly, permits much of 
this technological surveillance to take place without impinging 
on any constitutional interests.2 In an effort to counteract this 
tendency, the book constructs a Fourth Amendment frame-
work—meant to apply to every type of government investiga-
tive technique, technologically enhanced or not—that is both 
more faithful to precedent and more attentive to the empirical 
reality of how the techniques affect individual interests and 
meet law enforcement needs. 
The principal component of this framework is the idea that 
the justification for a government search or seizure ought to be 
roughly proportionate to the invasiveness of the search or sei-
zure.3 This proportionality principle is a simple but powerful 
concept found throughout American jurisprudence, including a 
number of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases.4 
 
†  Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law 
School. Copyright © 2010 by Christopher Slobogin. 
 1. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 23–25 (describing cases).  
 3. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 21–48.  
 4. Id. at 21, 28–30 (describing proportionality reasoning in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and in various other settings in connection with standards 
of proof, equal protection law, and tort law). 
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But, as noted above, the Court’s specific Fourth Amendment 
holdings leave a wide array of surveillance techniques unregu-
lated. Relying in part on surveys measuring the public’s atti-
tudes toward surveillance, Privacy at Risk argues to the con-
trary that most types of surveillance are sufficiently intrusive 
to require justification, albeit not always at the probable cause 
level.5  
Two well-known scholars who have reviewed the book are 
Orin Kerr and Peter Swire. Professor Kerr is much more com-
fortable with the Court’s current position on the Fourth 
Amendment than I am, and disagrees with my attempt to con-
stitutionalize and empiricize regulation of government surveil-
lance.6 Professor Swire is willing to contemplate my proposals, 
but wishes that I had devoted more attention to national secu-
rity issues and to transnational law that is consistent with my 
approach.7 This Symposium8 provides an opportunity to re-
spond to these reviews and, in the process, elaborate on some of 
the arguments made in Privacy at Risk. On the latter score, I 
rely on two works published after Privacy at Risk. The first, 
David Faigman’s Constitutional Fictions, emphasizes the im-
portance of empirical findings to constitutional adjudication.9 
The second, Richard Worf ’s article on general suspicionless 
searches and seizures,10 bolsters my brief observations in Pri-
vacy at Risk about the relevance of political-process theory to 
efforts at justifying surveillance of groups.11  
I.  THE THESIS OF PRIVACY AT RISK   
Professor Kerr calls the proportionality principle that I ad-
vance in Privacy at Risk “a new approach to the Fourth 
Amendment.”12 But proportionality reasoning in Fourth 
Amendment cases is not my invention. Much of the Supreme 
 
 5. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 6. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 951, 966 (2009). 
 7. Peter P. Swire, Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 751, 751 (2009). 
 8. Symposium, Cyberspace and the Law: Privacy, Property, and Crime in 
the Virtual Frontier, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1303 (2010).  
 9. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 162 (2008).  
 10. Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Sus-
picionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 11. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 18.  
 12. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 951. 
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Court’s search and seizure jurisprudence is consistent with the 
idea that the more privacy-invading or autonomy-limiting a po-
lice action is, the more justification the government must show 
before it may be carried out. Thus, while most searches of 
houses and most arrests are only permissible if the police have 
probable cause,13 lesser searches, such as pat-downs, and lesser 
seizures, such as field stops, only require reasonable suspi-
cion.14 For brief seizures at sobriety and illegal-immigrant 
roadblocks no individualized justification is necessary.15  
Admittedly, in some “special needs” situations, such as 
drug testing of employees or school children, the Court has al-
lowed seemingly serious intrusions on virtually no suspicion, 
and thus appears to have departed from the proportionality 
idea.16 Those situations, however, usually involve searches of 
groups rather than individuals, a situation that requires a dif-
ferent mode of analysis.17 In most of its Fourth Amendment 
cases, the Court has adhered, consciously or not, to the notion 
expressed in 1967 in Terry v. Ohio that “there is ‘no ready test 
 
 13. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–90 (1980) (holding 
that the nonexigent entry of a home to effect an arrest or search requires a 
warrant based on probable cause because the Fourth Amendment “unequivo-
cally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion’” (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).  
 14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (permitting a frisk for weapons 
and the predicate stop on less than probable cause because it only “constitutes 
a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the per-
son”). 
 15. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) 
(upholding suspicionless stops at sobriety checkpoints, given “the balance of 
the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this 
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of in-
trusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped”); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (upholding suspicionless check-
points to detect illegal immigrants because “the reasonableness of the proce-
dures followed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion 
on the interests of motorists minimal”). 
 16. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (upholding 
suspicionless drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities, 
stating that “[i]t is true that we generally determine the reasonableness of a 
search by balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual’s privacy 
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests [but] in the context 
of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable 
cause may be reasonable when special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 146–57. 
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for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the 
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search 
[or seizure] entails.’”18  
The problem with the Court’s post-Terry cases is not their 
adoption of a balancing framework but their willingness to 
make blithe assumptions about the “invasiveness” of the gov-
ernment actions and to treat legislative and executive allega-
tions of law enforcement “need” as givens. Instead, I argue, the 
Court should engage in strict scrutiny analysis of government 
efforts to obtain evidence of wrongdoing.19 Privacy at Risk ela-
borates on this argument by focusing on two different types of 
government surveillance, “physical surveillance” and “transac-
tion surveillance.” Physical surveillance refers to real-time ob-
servation of physical behavior with the naked eye or with tech-
nology such as binoculars, night scopes, tracking devices, and 
surveillance cameras.20 Transaction surveillance involves ob-
taining information about transactions from third-party record-
holders, such as banks, credit card agencies and Internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs).21 With the help of technology, both types 
of surveillance have increased exponentially in the past dec-
ade.22  
Yet the Court’s construal of the Fourth Amendment has 
left these investigative techniques entirely unregulated as a 
constitutional matter. Katz v. United States’ definition of 
“search”—to wit, any government action that infringes “[an] 
expectation [of privacy] that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable”23—seems expansive. But since Katz was decided in 
1967 the Court has been extremely grudging in its approach to 
the Fourth Amendment’s threshold. According to the Court’s 
post-Katz case law, it is not reasonable to expect privacy in 
connection with any activity, including activity that takes place 
inside the home, that can conceivably be seen from a lawful 
vantage point with the naked eye or with technology that is in 
general public use, such as binoculars.24 Even more incredibly, 
 
 18. 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 
(1967)). 
 19. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 17. 
 20. See id. at 6–9 (defining physical surveillance). 
 21. See id. at 9–13 (defining transaction surveillance). 
 22. See id. at 3.  
 23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
 24. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (strongly sug-
gesting that no search occurs “where . . . Government uses a device that 
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the Court has held that the public “assumes the risk” that per-
sonal information surrendered to third parties such as banks 
and phone companies will be disclosed to the government upon 
demand, and thus can expect no privacy in that context ei-
ther.25  
In Privacy at Risk, I argue that this series of decisions by 
the Court is conceptually bankrupt, principally because of the 
Court’s refusal to recognize that expectations of privacy can on-
ly be gauged through some real world referent, such as positive 
law governing ordinary citizens or the considered views of the 
population.26 Neither source provides much support for the 
Court’s holdings. In many jurisdictions, it is often a crime, or at 
least a tort, for private citizens to engage in “peeping Tomism” 
of the home.27 And various federal and state statutes guarantee 
the confidentiality of records maintained by hospitals, banks, 
schools, and other institutions, and penalize breach of this con-
fidentiality with civil and even criminal penalties.28 Yet the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence declares that the 
American public can expect no privacy vis-à-vis government 
voyeurism or perusal of our transactions.  
Where legislation governing surveillance by the private 
sector does not exist (usually because, as with public camera 
surveillance, there is no private-surveillance analogy) or does 
not provide an indication of how private particular types of ac-
tivities or records are, Privacy at Risk argues that surveys of 
the population should be considered relevant to Fourth 
 
is . . . in general public use, to explore details of the home . . . without physical 
intrusion”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding that 
the viewing of a backyard from an airplane in navigable airspace was not a 
search because “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced 
down could have seen everything that these officers observed”).  
 25. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consis-
tently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in in-
formation he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Gov-
ernment.”). 
 26. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 108–10. The Court itself has recognized 
this point in the abstract. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) 
(“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by socie-
ty.”). In practice, however, the Court has ignored it. 
 27. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 68–69. 
 28. Id. at 157–58. 
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Amendment analysis.29 Over the past fifteen years I have con-
ducted three such surveys, usually relying on jury pools to as-
sure a diverse, randomly selected sample.30 Each sample re-
ceived a number of scenarios, most taken from Supreme Court 
cases, depicting various types of government investigative 
techniques, and was asked to rate the “intrusiveness” of the 
techniques on a scale of 1 to 100, with 100 being the most in-
trusive.31  
My findings with respect to the various surveillance scena-
rios can be summarized as follows: virtually all forms of trans-
action surveillance as well as overt public camera surveillance 
are viewed, on average, as more intrusive than a roadblock, 
and government efforts to access records from websites, ISPs, 
pharmacies, and banks are perceived to be as intrusive as a 
search of a car.32 If these results are replicated by other studies, 
they could be said to describe the relative privacy “reasonable 
people” expect vis-à-vis these types of government intrusion. 
Further, a proportionality analysis based on these results 
would hold that establishment of a public camera system re-
quires at least as much justification as the erection of a road-
block, and that government attempts to obtain records of many 
types of transactions require the same level of justification as 
the search of a car⎯probable cause. 
Further description of Privacy at Risk will be incorporated 
into my responses to the comments by Professors Kerr and 
Swire. Most of this discussion will focus on Professor Kerr’s 
comments because they are more critical of the book. Following 
the organization Professor Kerr adopts in his review, the re-
sponse to the Kerr and Swire critiques will focus on the two 
 
 29. Id. at 113–16. 
 30. The surveys, all of which are discussed in Privacy at Risk, first ap-
peared in Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008) [hereinafter, Slobogin, Data 
Mining]; Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277 (2002); Christopher 
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understand-
ings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 (1993).  
 31. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 111. 
 32. See id. at 112 (showing a mean intrusiveness rating (MIR) of 35 for 
roadblock scenario and of 53 for overt camera scenario in which tapes are de-
stroyed); see also id. at 184 (showing MIRs for scenarios involving obtaining 
information from websites, ISPs, pharmacies, and banks between 74.4 and 
78.0). 
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sides of the proportionality inquiry: intrusiveness and justifica-
tion.33 
II.  THE NATURE OF INTRUSIVENESS   
As both Professor Kerr and Professor Swire point out, cru-
cial to application of the proportionality principle that I propose 
in Privacy at Risk is an assessment of intrusiveness. Professor 
Swire finds “useful” my proposal that the government’s justifi-
cation for a search or seizure bear a relationship to its intru-
siveness, and he “particularly like[d]” the reliance on empirical 
surveys as a means of informing the courts about reasonable 
expectations of privacy.34 Professor Kerr reacts quite different-
ly. He argues that asking people to rate police actions on an 
“intrusiveness” scale does not accurately capture privacy expec-
tations, that even if it did courts would have great difficulty 
knowing how to use such empirical results, and that even if 
courts could carry out the latter role they should not do so, be-
cause ultimately assessment of societal expectations of privacy 
is not very important for Fourth Amendment purposes. I will 
address each of these points in turn. 
A. INTRUSIVENESS AS THE MEASURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
INTERESTS 
Professor Kerr believes that “measuring intrusiveness does 
not actually measure how much a technique infringes on civil 
liberties,” and thus that my intrusiveness surveys are mislead-
ing on that score.35 The word “intrusiveness” undoubtedly does 
 
 33. This focus means that this Article (like Professor Kerr’s review) neg-
lects several aspects of Privacy at Risk. Kerr’s review looks only at the discus-
sion of the proportionality principle in Chapter 2 and three later chapters 
(Chapters 4, 5, and 7) describing how that principle would apply to surveil-
lance of public activities and to transaction surveillance. See Kerr, supra note 
6, at 952. Chapter 2 also develops the “exigency” principle (which requires ex 
ante review of nonemergency searches and seizures) and critiques other 
Fourth Amendment theories. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1. Also not discussed here 
or in Kerr’s review are Chapter 3, which is devoted to technological surveil-
lance of the home; Chapter 6, which provides an historical analysis of subpoe-
na law (an analysis that is crucial to understanding how we ended up without 
any constitutional regulation of transaction surveillance); and Chapter 8, 
which is a concluding discussion of how the “liberal” view of the Fourth 
Amendment—requiring individualized probable cause for all searches and ex-
clusion as a remedy—has inadvertently and ironically resulted in a much 
smaller Fourth Amendment than we would have if liberals had been a little 
less greedy. Id.  
 34. Swire, supra note 7, at 757. 
 35. Kerr, supra note 6, at 959.  
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not capture all of privacy’s dimensions. Nonetheless, directly 
asking people whether they expect “privacy” in a given situa-
tion is not a productive means of assessing their views on the 
privacy interests affected by police actions, for a variety of rea-
sons.36 More importantly, the Supreme Court itself often uses 
“intrusiveness” or “invasiveness” as a proxy for analyzing the 
individual interests at stake in Fourth Amendment cases; in-
deed, well over 200 of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
opinions rely on one or both phrases for this purpose.37 Thus, 
for instance, in Scott v. Harris, decided two terms ago, the 
Court stated, “[i]n determining the reasonableness of the man-
ner in which a seizure is effected, ‘[w]e must balance the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amend-
ment interests against the importance of the governmental in-
terests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”38 In the Court’s search 
cases as well, ranging from Terry to the more recent string of 
“special needs” cases, the conclusion that a particular technique 
is relatively unintrusive is usually crucial in holdings favoring 
relaxation of Fourth Amendment strictures.39  
Nonetheless, Professor Kerr argues that use of the word 
“intrusiveness” skewed my survey results. To him, the word 
 
 36. One reason, of course, is precisely the fact that the concept of privacy 
is open to so many interpretations. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptua-
lizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (exploring the multiple meanings 
of privacy). Additionally, framing the survey in terms of privacy expectations 
would have signaled the purpose of the survey to those who know Fourth 
Amendment law, would not have permitted sensible answers to scenarios in-
volving seizures rather than searches, and would have in essence asked the 
intrusiveness question in any event, with a question sounding something like: 
“On a scale of 1 to 100, how significant is the privacy invasion in the following 
scenarios?” A further advantage of using the word “intrusion” without refer-
ence to privacy is that it minimizes the effect of foreknowledge about the law: 
one might feel intruded upon despite a subjective recognition that the law does 
not consider the intrusion to be an invasion of privacy.  
 37. See generally Chart Prepared by Andrew Cunningham, Student, Van-
derbilt University Law School (2009) (on file with author) (depicting holdings 
in 227 U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases in which “intrusion” or 
“invasion” or some variant thereof was used in describing the Court’s reason-
ing).  
 38. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007) (quoting United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
 39. See supra notes 13–16; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653–54 (1979) (“The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth 
Amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order 
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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“intrusive” means “interference with the status quo,” so that 
“police techniques that are uncommon, unexpected, or high-
profile will tend to be seen as intrusive.”40 Thus, he argues, my 
survey participants may have indicated that a surveillance 
technique such as use of video cameras arrayed along a public 
street is relatively intrusive because it is not yet pervasive, not 
because people sense that their civil liberties would be in-
fringed by the practice.41  
A first response to this observation is that, if unexpected-
ness were correlated with intrusiveness as Professor Kerr sug-
gests, then my survey participants should have arrived at dif-
ferent rankings than they did. For instance, they should have 
ranked scenarios such as those involving covert video surveil-
lance and data mining as very intrusive, because their occur-
rence is rare, whereas searches of cars and pat-downs should 
have been seen as relatively unintrusive, since these are daily 
and well-understood events. Yet I obtained precisely the oppo-
site results.42 More fundamentally, if it turned out that unex-
pectedness did have a high correlation with intrusiveness in 
some types of cases, it is not clear why that is a problem; after 
all, the Court’s test speaks of “expectations” of privacy. If we 
discount the public’s belief that an investigative technique is 
intrusive when that technique is new or unusual, we move in 
the direction of granting Fourth Amendment immunity to the 
type of innovative technological surveillance that became com-
monplace in Orwell’s society of 1984.43  
This comment leads directly to another criticism that Pro-
fessor Kerr makes about the intrusiveness construct. He states 
that the public cannot accurately evaluate the invasiveness of 
physical and transaction surveillance because the media (irres-
ponsibly) associates these techniques with “Big Brother.”44 But 
if the public is reacting to surveillance in a media-driven, knee-
jerk fashion, my survey participants presumably would not 
have ranked covert cameras lower than both searching a jun-
 
 40. Kerr, supra note 6, at 958. 
 41. Id. at 959. 
 42. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 112 (indicating an MIR of 35 for covert 
video surveillance and an MIR of 68 for a patdown); id. at 184 (showing MIRs 
of 32.4, 34.1, and 38.5 for various types of data mining and an MIR of 74.6 for 
a car search). 
 43. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 5 (Signet Classics 1981) (1949) (describ-
ing an omnipresent government-monitored “telescreen”).  
 44. Kerr, supra note 6, at 960 (calling some media depictions of surveil-
lance techniques “comically incorrect”). 
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kyard or overt use of cameras, nor would they have ranked da-
ta mining of airplane passenger lists much lower than pat-
downs or data mining of phone records.45 The subjects in my 
surveys appear to make an earnest effort to rank the various 
scenarios according to how intrusive they think each is; they 
are not lumping all the surveillance techniques into one Big 
Brother category.  
A final criticism Professor Kerr makes of the way in which 
the surveys were conducted focuses on the fact that I told par-
ticipants to assume the targets of the police were innocent.46 I 
did so because the Supreme Court has held that the innocent 
target is the appropriate perspective for determining when a 
seizure has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes.47 Al-
though Professor Kerr correctly points out that the Court has 
never said that the same perspective applies to analysis of 
searches,48 I can think of no good reason for distinguishing the 
two situations. 
But Professor Kerr is apparently making a larger point 
than a mere quibble over the explicit holdings of the Court. He 
states, “[a] technique used exclusively to target the guilty 
would be much less intrusive than one often used to target the 
innocent. As a result, any assessment of the civil liberties 
threat posed by a particular investigative technique must ac-
count for the settings in which the police employ the tech-
nique.”49 Professor Kerr seems to be saying that since my “in-
nocent target” assumption applied to all the scenarios, ranging 
from those usually aimed at highly suspicious people (such as 
bedroom searches and requests for bank records) to those tar-
geting primarily innocent people (such as roadblocks and data 
mining), it somehow tainted the results.  
If Professor Kerr is arguing that intrusiveness ratings 
change depending on the perceived guilt of the target, he is 
probably right. But results from my first study, which are brief-
 
 45. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 112 (showing an MIR of 42 for covert 
camera surveillance, of 51 for search of a junkyard, and of 53 for overt camera 
use); id. at 184 (showing an MIR of 32.4 for data mining of passenger lists, 
71.5 for a patdown, and 74.1 for data mining of phone records).  
 46. Kerr, supra note 6, at 959. 
 47. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (“[T]he potential in-
trusiveness of the officers’ conduct must be judged from the viewpoint of an 
innocent person in [his] position.” (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 
n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).  
 48. Kerr, supra note 6, at 961. 
 49. Id. at 960. 
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ly noted in Privacy at Risk,50 should allay any concern that this 
dynamic diminished the value of the survey results. In that 
study, conducted with Joseph Schumacher, we admittedly did 
find that subjects’ ratings of intrusiveness usually dropped 
when we varied the scenarios by including a description of the 
specific evidence sought (e.g., search of a bedroom versus 
search of a bedroom for drugs).51 We also found that the se-
riousness of the crime under investigation correlated inversely 
with intrusiveness ratings; thus, for instance, the scenario in-
volving a pat-down for evidence of terrorism was seen as much 
less intrusive than the pat-down scenario that did not specify 
the evidence sought.52 However, we further found that the in-
trusiveness hierarchy stayed relatively intact regardless of the 
crime or context involved.53 For instance, holding the serious-
ness of the crime or the police’s suspicions constant, frisks are 
always seen as less intrusive than perusal of bank records, and 
roadblocks are always seen as less intrusive than technological 
physical surveillance of private property.54 If the object of a 
search or the guilt of the target affects intrusiveness ratings, it 
affects all of them roughly equally. 
Professor Kerr might instead be arguing that, regardless of 
how survey participants responded, conclusions about intru-
siveness should differ in each case depending upon the sus-
 
 50. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 51. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 30, at 759. More specifically, we 
found that when a scenario both described the target as the survey participant 
(rather than some third party) and described the evidence being sought (as 
opposed to not mentioning any evidence), the combined mean for all fifty sce-
narios was fifteen points lower (48.93 compared to 63.19). Id. Dr. Schumacher 
is a Ph.D. psychologist who assisted in the empirical analysis. 
 52. Id. at 764 tbl.4; see also id. at 767 (describing “dangerousness theory” 
of intrusiveness, to the effect that if the subject believes the target of the 
search is dangerous, the perceived intrusiveness of a police action will be low-
er). 
 53. Id. at 764, 767–68 (finding consistency between the scenarios at the 
top and bottom of the rankings, and significant inconsistencies only with re-
spect to ten scenarios, perhaps explainable by the extent to which subjects 
viewed the target of the search to be dangerous); see also Jeremy A. Blumen-
thal et al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of 
Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 349–50 (2009) (finding “high correlations 
between overall intrusiveness ratings of stimuli in samples with and without 
context”—context meaning a description of what the police were looking for—
but noting variations upon closer examination of particular contexts).  
 54. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 30, at 762–63 tbl.3 (showing, 
across all conditions, a pat-down rated as 19, 21, 27, and 9; perusal of bank 
records rated as 36, 40, 38, and 36; roadblocks rated as 9, 16, 15, and 13; and 
viewing a backyard with binoculars rated as 34, 33, 35, and 29). 
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pected guilt of the target or the nature of the crime. If so, he is 
conflating the intrusiveness inquiry with the justification in-
quiry, which is based on how certain the police are that they 
will find the evidence they seek. Only after the intrusiveness of 
a technique in general is determined should the analysis move 
to the circumstances under which it may take place. More is 
said about that issue below. 
B. THE COURTS’ CAPACITY TO USE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Professor Kerr next argues that even if intrusiveness sur-
veys are relevant to expectation of privacy analysis, a require-
ment that courts rely on them would create nightmares for 
judges. He writes:  
What if the people Slobogin queried have unrepresentative views? 
What if public opinion varies by state or region or age or race? Can 
the Court create a constitutional rule based on survey results without 
even knowing the actual questions asked? And what if public opinion 
changes over time—should the courts change the rule when public 
opinion changes, such as after a terrorist attack or the release of an 
influential movie about surveillance? How would judges know when 
public opinion has changed? And how should courts reconcile dueling 
surveys? . . . Slobogin’s method requires courts to have answers to all 
of these questions.55 
These are great objections, and worthy of answers. In Pri-
vacy at Risk, I emphasized that before courts rely on survey re-
sults, those results must be replicated (as has already occurred 
with respect to my first study).56 Unless and until robust re-
sults are achieved, constitutional doctrine should not change. 
But if, as seems increasingly likely, surveys indicate that most 
people perceive transaction surveillance of financial, medical, 
and other records to be as intrusive as a search of a car, and 
systemic public surveillance to be more intrusive than a road-
block, then courts purporting to apply the societal expectation 
of privacy test should not be able to ignore these results simply 
because evaluating empirical information is difficult. Courts 
deal with survey data in many different contexts. Professor 
Swire notes, for instance, that consumer surveys routinely in-
 
 55. Kerr, supra note 6, at 964. 
 56. Using a more sophisticated methodology, Professors Blumenthal, 
Adya, and Mogle conducted a study that relied on the same scenarios used in 
our study and found that their “[data] are quite consistent with [Slobogin and 
Schumacher’s] results; each of our samples correlated highly with their overall 
data.” See Blumenthal et al., supra note 53, at 345. However, they also found 
that context affected their results. See id. at 348–51.  
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fluence trademark cases.57 Courts are capable of sorting 
through data about intrusiveness as well.58  
As to Professor Kerr’s important queries about how the 
courts should deal with changes in public attitudes, several 
responses are worth making. I suggested in Privacy at Risk 
that society’s views about relative intrusiveness are unlikely to 
budge once the Court sets them as the Fourth Amendment 
standard.59 The Court’s pronouncements would not only rein-
force those views but also inhibit the introduction of techniques 
that courts have declared intrusive, and thus make public in-
urement to them less likely. That is not to deny the validity of 
Professor Kerr’s supposition that a terrorist attack might affect 
public attitudes about intrusiveness. My second and third stu-
dies, conducted after September 11, 2001, found reduced intru-
siveness ratings compared to those assigned to similar scena-
rios in the first, pre-9/11 study, probably because post-9/11 
participants were willing to give up civil liberties in exchange 
for more security.60 But, again, the hierarchy stayed the same: 
almost all scenarios received lower intrusiveness ratings in the 
later studies, meaning that the findings most relevant to pro-
portionality analysis remained stable.61  
I do not mean to suggest by this discussion that societal 
views about relative privacy could never change (the younger 
generation’s flirtation with exhibiting their personal lives on 
phone video and Facebook suggests as much).62 But if these 
 
 57. Swire, supra note 7, at 757. 
 58. Much of the empirical information could be provided in briefs. See 
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, 
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 496 (1986) (“If 
the research is more analogous to law than to fact, the parties should present 
the research to the court in the same manner that they would offer legal pre-
cedents, that is, in written briefs rather than by oral testimony.”). Moreover, 
indeterminate empirical results are not necessarily irrelevant. As Professor 
Faigman has noted, “[t]he empirical uncertainties of factual statements are as 
important as the statements themselves and should be part of the legal calcu-
lus.” FAIGMAN, supra note 9, at 162. 
 59. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 114. 
 60. For instance, the roadblock scenario received an MIR of 46 and a body 
cavity search at the border an MIR of 90 in the 1993 study, compared to an 
MIR of 35 for the roadblock and a 75 for the body cavity search in the 2002 
study. Compare Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 30, at 738–39, with SLO-
BOGIN, supra note 1, at 112.  
 61. Compare SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 112, 184, with Slobogin & Schu-
macher, supra note 30, at 738–39 (showing pre-9/11 and post-9/11 scenario 
hierarchies that are very similar).  
 62. See, e.g., Janet Kornblum, Privacy: That’s Old-School: Internet Gener-
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views do undergo a metamorphosis, an intrusiveness-driven 
Fourth Amendment should (and will be able to) accommodate 
them. As I stated in Privacy at Risk, if society’s views did 
“change substantially—for instance, if twenty years from now, 
government-run CCTV is seen as much less intrusive than 
searching foliage in a public park or much more intrusive than 
a frisk—then Fourth Amendment analysis should probably 
change with them.”63 The next section further explicates this 
point. 
C. THE SOCIETAL EXPECTATION TEST 
Even if the various methodological and implementation ob-
jections to intrusiveness surveys can be dismissed, Professor 
Kerr does not think such surveys should govern Fourth 
Amendment analysis.64 He points out that the Supreme Court 
explicitly relies on the societal expectations of privacy test only 
in connection with determining when a government action is a 
search, not when it is establishing the appropriate justification 
for conduct that has already been denominated a search.65 And 
even in connection with the Fourth Amendment’s threshold 
question, Professor Kerr argues that the analysis should con-
sist of “normative assessments of the costs and benefits of sub-
jecting a legal technique to constitutional regulation,” not an 
assessment of societal expectations of privacy.66  
On its face, Kerr’s proposal ignores precedent—Katz’s ex-
pectation of privacy test—much more forthrightly than Profes-
sor Kerr claims that I do.67 In any event, privacy cannot be eva-
 
ation Views Openness in a New Way, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2007, at D1 (noting 
that people today have less concern about privacy in some respects because of 
familiarity with new technologies). 
 63. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 114. Certainly the Court’s views on intru-
siveness, and probably society’s views as well, have changed in the past, in 
both directions. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (dec-
laring bugging of a phone booth a search), with Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (declaring wiretapping of a phone not a search); compare 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967) (holding seizure of mere evi-
dence permissible), with Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) 
(holding seizure of mere evidence not permissible); compare Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43 (1906) (permitting subpoena for business papers), with Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (prohibiting seizure of business papers).  
 64. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 960–61. 
 65. Id. at 961. 
 66. Id. at 961 n.14. 
 67. At one point, Professor Kerr states that my approach would require “a 
dramatic revision of current doctrine” and then asserts that “[i]t is difficult to 
justify a revision of current doctrine on the ground that some aspects of cur-
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luated “normatively” without inquiring into what people think 
about it. Reliance on surveys of the type I carried out to estab-
lish Fourth Amendment norms does smack of putting search 
and seizure law up for a vote, which runs against the constitu-
tional grain.68 But some sort of mechanism for measuring pub-
lic attitudes about the invasiveness of government attempts to 
pry into our lives is crucial if privacy is the appropriate metric. 
As Robert Post has explained (in a statement I quote in Privacy 
at Risk), the only way to get a sense of what privacy means in 
this context is to look at “social forms of respect that we owe 
each other as members of a common community.”69 Thus, Post 
concludes, “there can ultimately be no other measure of privacy 
than the social norms that actually exist in our civilization.”70 
We need to be careful about how we measure those norms, but 
we must measure them if we care about privacy.  
Professor Kerr might respond that the Court does not 
mean what it says when it states that the threshold of the 
Fourth Amendment is determined by “expectations of privacy.” 
Rather, this phrase is code that the Justices use to refer to 
their own balancing of individual interests against the govern-
ment’s need for evidence of crime.71 If that is so, on what basis 
is the Court determining the scope of individual interests at 
stake in Fourth Amendment cases?  
In other work, Professor Kerr has identified three relevant 
“models” that he says the Court has used to operationalize the 
Katz test.72 The “private facts” model, which “asks whether the 
 
rent doctrine require it.” Id. at 961. I have to confess I do not understand this 
argument. First, by investigating society’s expectations of privacy, I am adher-
ing to Katz’s original formulation. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 68–69 (quot-
ing Court language that confirms this formulation). Although I am obviously 
arguing for a different interpretation of that formulation than subsequent 
Court opinions have given it, scholars routinely argue that the Court is mis-
construing its own doctrine, whether the issue is Miranda, equal protection, or 
prior restraint. I am not clear why that is “difficult.”  
 68. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 
(1943) (“One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”). 
 69. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 
(2001). 
 70. Id. at 2094. 
 71. Kerr, supra note 6, at 961 n.14 (“[T]he Court’s applications [of the ex-
pectation of privacy test] generally rely on normative assessments of the costs 
and benefits of subjecting a legal technique to constitutional regulation.”). 
 72. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 503, 507–19 (2007). Kerr also identifies a fourth model, the “policy 
  
2010] PRIVACY & PUBLIC OPINION 1603 
 
government’s conduct reveals particularly private and personal 
information deserving of protection,” is the one that most close-
ly relates to my intrusiveness inquiry.73 Professor Kerr’s second 
model is based on “positive law,” to which I have also already 
alluded as an occasionally good proxy for assessing societal ex-
pectations.74 Finally, Professor Kerr describes a “probabilistic 
model,” which focuses on the risks of disclosure to others as we 
go about our daily business.75 This model is quite frequently in-
voked by the Court, in cases stating or implying that when 
people walk on the public streets, putter about in their yards, 
engage in activities near their windows, or conduct transac-
tions through banks, they assume the risk that other people, 
including those who work for law enforcement, will take note.76  
Although Professor Kerr treats these as three separate 
models, they all focus on the same metric: intrusiveness. Pro-
fessor Kerr recognizes this point, albeit inadvertently, in his 
discussion of each of the three models. For instance, in discuss-
ing the private-facts model he states, “[t]he nature of the in-
formation obtained by the government is obviously a critical 
aspect of its invasiveness and need for legal regulation.”77 Re-
garding the positive-law model he writes, “[t]he selection of the 
positive-law model in physical entry cases makes sense: it pro-
vides clear and familiar ex ante guidance for police, and in this 
context it resonates with our intuitions as to what kind of in-
vestigative steps are only modestly invasive and what steps are 
highly invasive.”78 And in reference to the probabilistic model 
he states, “social practice will tend to reflect the invasiveness of 
a particular technique relatively directly: if an unusual tech-
nique leads to the discovery of evidence, it is likely that the 
technique was also unusually invasive.”79  
Just as importantly, all three models—not just the private-
facts model—require resort to empirical reality of the sort ob-
 
model,” wherein “[j]udges must consider the consequences of regulating a par-
ticular type of government activity, weigh privacy and security interests, and 
opt for the better rule.” Id. at 519. This way of looking at the Katz test con-
flates justification with intrusion and so is not discussed here, but rather is 
addressed (implicitly) in Part III.  
 73. Id. at 506. 
 74. Id.; see supra note 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 75. Kerr, supra note 72, at 506. 
 76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 77. Kerr, supra note 72, at 534. 
 78. Id. at 544. 
 79. Id. 
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tained through surveys. Positive law is, of course, the result of 
a survey, albeit one mediated through the democratic process. 
And the probabilistic model’s assertions about risks of expo-
sure—the risk of our banking transactions being seen by unau-
thorized persons80 or the risk that strangers in airplanes will 
look down and notice activities in the backyard of a home81—
are also statements about reality that can be empirically inves-
tigated.82  
In short, judgments about the nature of individual inter-
ests at stake in Fourth Amendment cases are not “normative” 
in the legal sense, as Professor Kerr asserts,83 but inevitably 
based on facts relating to intrusiveness. In his recent book, 
Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional 
Facts, Professor David Faigman demonstrates that a wide 
range of constitutional jurisprudence—in cases involving school 
desegregation, abortion, preventive detention, and search and 
seizure—is replete with factual assumptions.84 Unfortunately, 
courts, like Professor Kerr, do not always admit or recognize 
that reality.85 As Professor Faigman notes, “[f]acts for the 
Court are a constituent part of the interpretive exercise. They 
are not so much discovered as created.”86  
Professor Kerr provides an example of this phenomenon 
toward the end of his review where he argues that, even if rela-
tive intrusiveness is the correct test, there is a much easier way 
 
 80. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor 
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government . . . even if the information is re-
vealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).  
 81. Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is vir-
tually nonexistent.”). 
 82. Indeed, my research suggests that the probabilistic model coincides 
with the notion of how invasive an investigative technique is perceived to be. 
For instance, the fact that my survey participants gave an MIR of 80.3 to the 
perusal of bank records scenario, SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 184, and an MIR 
of 50 to helicopter overflights of backyards, id. at 112, can be read to indicate 
that they do not assume such records are routinely made available to third 
parties or that such flights are common.  
 83. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 523 (stating that the private-facts model 
“requires a normative assessment of the ‘privateness’ of the information”). 
 84. FAIGMAN, supra note 9, at 1–3 (speaking of the “pervasiveness of fac-
tual issues in constitutional cases”).  
 85. Id. at xii. 
 86. Id. at 15. 
  
2010] PRIVACY & PUBLIC OPINION 1605 
 
to implement it than through consulting surveys.87 In support 
of that view, he describes a series of opinions from the New 
Jersey Supreme Court holding that bank, phone, and ISP ad-
dress records are protected under New Jersey’s constitution be-
cause they are associated with a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.88 Without endorsing those results, Professor Kerr notes 
that they are similar to those I might reach, but states the way 
the court reached it—through assumptions about what people 
regard as private—is preferable to my empirical method, be-
cause it “offers a more direct and simple path”89 than reliance 
on “public opinion surveys that courts are ill suited to apply 
and interpret.”90  
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s method surely is simpler, 
but it is the same suspect method on which the Supreme Court 
has relied in coming to the opposite conclusion: judicial fiat. 
Other than referring to precedent, the New Jersey court’s rea-
soning in these cases consists of guesses about people’s expecta-
tions in dealing with banks, ISPs, and phone companies and 
descriptions of the types of information the government can ob-
tain from their records.91 Moreover, these guesses appear to be 
wrong.92 The court concluded that these records, although pro-
tected by New Jersey’s search and seizure provision, can be ob-
tained via a grand jury subpoena simply on a showing of relev-
ance,93 which in New Jersey means that the documents need 
merely “bear some possible relationship, however indirect, to 
the . . . investigation.”94 That conclusion would be inconsistent 
with proportionality analysis if findings like those I have ob-
tained are replicated. My research indicates that most people 
 
 87. Kerr, supra note 6, at 964–66. 
 88. Id. at 965–66.  
 89. Id. at 965. 
 90. Id. at 966. 
 91. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) (noting that users 
of the Web “have reason to expect that their actions are confidential”); State v. 
McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 874 (N.J. 2005) (“[B]ank customers voluntarily pro-
vide their information to banks, but they do so with the understanding that it 
will remain confidential.”); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. 1982) 
(“From the viewpoint of the customer, all the information which he furnishes 
with respect to a particular call is private.”). 
 92. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 184 (indicating a high MIR for trans-
action records); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Reid, 945 A.2d at 35–36. 
 94. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 401 A.2d 258, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1979) (per curiam) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 391 F. 
Supp. 991, 995 (D.R.I. 1975)). 
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associate bank, phone, and ISP records with a high degree of 
privacy, on par with intrusions that the Supreme Court has 
held require reasonable suspicion or probable cause.95  
To this conclusion, Professor Kerr might raise his previous-
ly noted objection that the Supreme Court has never formally 
applied societal expectation of privacy analysis to police con-
duct that has already been designated a search.96 While that is 
technically correct, in fact the Court routinely modulates the 
degree of justification required for a search based on relative 
intrusiveness. As mentioned above, scores of Court decisions 
have done so since Katz v. United States established the rea-
sonable expectation test.97  
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decisions on transaction 
surveillance provide one further example of that phenomenon. 
The plaintiffs in that court’s most recent transaction surveil-
lance case, involving subscriber information held by ISPs, ar-
gued that because previous case law had established that rela-
tively unrevealing utility records could be obtained with an ex 
parte subpoena, something more should be required in order to 
obtain subscriber information.98 The court disagreed, not be-
cause it rejected the factual premise that ISP records are more 
private than utility records, but rather because it had already 
held that accessing bank records only requires a subpoena: 
Utility records expose less information about a person’s private life 
than either bank records or subscriber information. But we see no 
material difference between bank records and ISP subscriber infor-
mation and decline to treat them differently. They reveal comparably 
detailed information about one’s private affairs and are entitled to 
comparable protection under our law.99  
Although I think the court’s ultimate holding (allowing the 
government to obtain ISP information via subpoena)100 is 
wrong, the point here is that proportionality analysis based on 
intrusiveness pervades judicial analysis not only in determin-
ing the Fourth Amendment’s threshold, but also in determining 
 
 95. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 184 (indicating an MIR of 80.3 for 
bank records, 74.1 for phone records, and 57.5 for electricity records compared 
to an MIR of 71.5 for a pat-down and 74.6 for search of a car).  
 96. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 951. 
 97. See supra note 37.  
 98. Reid, 945 A.2d at 31; see also State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 395, 404 (N.J. 
2006) (requiring a subpoena to obtain utility records).  
 99. Reid, 945 A.2d at 36. 
 100. Id. 
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how much protection the Fourth Amendment should extend in 
situations where that threshold is reached.  
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT INTRUSIVENESS 
Honest judging would recognize that empirically derived 
privacy expectations are crucial in determining individual in-
terests in Fourth Amendment cases, at both the threshold level 
and once conduct has been determined to be a search. On the 
threshold issue, the Court has adopted a test—based on expec-
tations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable—that cries out for a factual resolution of the issue, and 
then has decided that it does not care about the relevant facts. 
On the issue of how much weight courts should give to individ-
ual interests in situations that are clearly searches, once again 
facts about intrusiveness perceptions should be important, if 
not dispositive; yet they often are not.  
In fairness to the courts and Professor Kerr, these types of 
facts are not easy to come by. As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court cases illustrate, it is simpler to be an armchair philoso-
pher than investigate the factual basis of one’s assumptions. 
This is especially true when that investigation requires eva-
luating scientific evidence, confidence intervals, and measures 
of statistical significance, an often daunting endeavor for many 
legally trained individuals.101 There is also the fear of change. 
As previously noted, if judicial facts are linked to real world 
perceptions, the basis for judicial decisions can be altered. That 
changeability threatens the stability of the law.  
More cynically, real facts will often get in the way of the 
results one wants to reach. Professor Faigman conjectures that 
one reason courts create facts rather than find them is a desire 
to maintain their power; they believe that allowing empiricists 
to determine reality would mean surrendering their dominion 
over the law.102 In response to this contention, Faigman argues 
that “fact-finding by fiat” also leads to “the almost certain ero-
sion of the legitimacy of the Court’s pronouncements.”103 And if, 
 
 101. Cf. Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: 
Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the 
Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1081 (2001) (“Legal scholars and practitioners . . . 
are often confounded by the principles of statistical analysis, risk assessment, 
probabilistic attribution, and attendant mathematical jargon.”). 
 102. FAIGMAN, supra note 9, at 16 (“An institution that surrenders its au-
thority to define the empirical world loses a considerable amount of its pow-
er.”). 
 103. Id. at 18. 
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as Professor Kerr seems to prefer, courts make a normative as-
sessment of the costs of a search even when those costs have 
been investigated scientifically, then they are taking on the role 
of philosopher-kings that Justice Scalia, at least, vehemently 
believes judges should avoid at all costs.104 
Professor Faigman also reminds us that, even in a more 
empirically based regime, courts will have plenty of power, be-
cause they will still play a crucial role in making normative 
judgments once the correct facts are found.105 As I stated in 
Privacy at Risk: 
Research such as that described here . . . only provides information 
concerning society’s views about relative intrusiveness. It does not tell 
the Court where to position the Fourth Amendment threshold (e.g., at 
a mean of 15 or 50 on a 100-point intrusiveness scale). The decision as 
to the level at which privacy expectations are accorded constitutional 
protection can still be a judicial, normative one that has precedential 
impact.106 
That judicial assessment would then set the stage, under the 
proportionality principle, for determining the type of justifica-
tion the government must proffer.  
III.  THE JUSTIFICATION INQUIRY   
Recall that under the proportionality principle advanced in 
Privacy at Risk, the government’s justification for a search or 
seizure must be roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness, and 
that the justification inquiry focuses on how certain police are 
about whether the search or seizure will produce the evidence 
they seek.107 Thus, under proportionality reasoning as I define 
it, the benefits of a search or seizure should be analyzed solely 
with reference to the extent to which the police action is likely 
to yield evidence of wrongdoing, measured in terms of certainty 
 
 104. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (Scalia, J.), 
abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (stating, while interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment, that “[t]o say, as the dissent says, that ‘it is for us 
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the 
death penalty,’ . . . not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth Amend-
ment originally prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive the society 
through its democratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the 
basis of what we think ‘proportionate’ and ‘measurably contributory to accept-
able goals of punishment’—to say and mean that, is to replace judges of the 
law with a committee of philosopher-kings” (quoting id. at 391 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 105. FAIGMAN, supra note 9, at 181 (“Enlightened constitutional practice 
can be neither solely normative nor exclusively empirical.”).  
 106. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 114. 
 107. For elaboration of this concept, see id. at 37–39. 
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levels such as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and the 
like. The more intrusive searches and seizures would require 
probable cause or perhaps even something more, whereas less 
intrusive searches and seizures could be justified on reasonable 
suspicion or relevance grounds or—if the intrusion is truly min-
imal—would not require any justification at all. 
Professor Kerr argues that “[t]his approach doesn’t work 
because the government’s amount of proof that a technique will 
yield evidence ex ante fails to correlate well with the degree to 
which the technique furthers government interests”108 in two 
ways. First, “the government’s degree of certainty ex ante is dif-
ferent from the likelihood of finding evidence ex post.”109 
Second, “the degree of confidence that some evidence will be 
found sheds little light on how much will be found or how help-
ful the evidence will be.”110 This second criticism is echoed, at 
least indirectly, by Professor Swire.111 I will take up these criti-
cisms in turn, and then end with a discussion of a more general 
concern of Professor Kerr’s, having to do with whether courts or 
legislatures are better situated to decide the justification issue. 
A. MEASURING CERTAINTY 
Professor Kerr points out that, outside of the warrant con-
text (where searches frequently produce evidence), little statis-
tical information about the efficacy of searches and seizures ex-
ists.112 From this observation, he somewhat mystically 
concludes that in most search and seizure situations “we can-
not rely on ex ante thresholds.”113 This would be news to the 
courts, which routinely evaluate the validity of a search or sei-
zure from an ex ante perspective, as well as to the average po-
lice officer, who on a daily basis decides to stop an individual or 
search a car based on a belief that he has a fair chance of unco-
vering evidence of crime.114 These assessments may not be 
 
 108. Kerr, supra note 6, at 962. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. See infra text accompanying notes 132–37.  
 112. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 962 (citing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., 
THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRAC-
TICES 138 tbl.6-2 (1983)). 
 113. Id.  
 114. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[I]n determining 
whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must 
be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to 
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based on mathematically sophisticated calculations, but the en-
tire edifice of Fourth Amendment law is based on the assump-
tion that courts and police can, to use Professor Kerr’s word, 
“rely” on such determinations.115  
At the same time, the government should seek data about 
possible success rates if feasible to do so. When searches or sei-
zures target specific individuals, such data might be hard to 
produce.116 But when the government engages in searches or 
seizures of groups, as it does with roadblocks, drug testing pro-
grams, camera surveillance, and data mining, some quantita-
tive estimation of a technique’s efficacy (i.e., a success rate or 
“hit rate”) will often be possible, based on past experience.117 In 
Privacy at Risk, I argued that just as intrusiveness can be stu-
died empirically, the justification inquiry can sometimes be 
quantified where group searches are concerned. Specifically, in 
group search situations the government should be required (1) 
to produce more than speculative conclusions about the likely 
hit rate (what I call “generalized suspicion”), and (2) to show 
that this hit rate is roughly proportionate to the intrusion vis-
ited upon the individuals in the group.118 Just as the courts 
should not be able to rely on gut reactions in making pro-
nouncements about intrusiveness when better information ex-
ists, they should not be able to declare, as the Supreme Court 
has done repeatedly in its special needs cases, that there is a 
significant crime problem without even seeking concrete evi-
dence to support the assertion.119  
 
the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts 
in light of his experience.”). 
 115. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (“Under 
ordinary circumstances, a search . . . will be ‘justified at its inception’ when 
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the [individual] has violated or is violating . . . the law . . . .”). 
 116. But see Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 915 (2009) (arguing that success rates of individual offic-
ers ought to be factored into the ex ante cause determination).  
 117. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1995) 
(describing significant drug activity among student athletes); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 608 (1989) (recounting that a large 
number of train accidents and safety incidents over an eight-year period were 
caused by drug- or alcohol-impaired employees).  
 118. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 39–44 (discussing levels of justification). 
 119. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (“We reject the 
Court of Appeals’ novel test that ‘any district seeking to impose a random sus-
picionless drug testing policy as a condition to participation in a school activity 
must demonstrate that there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a 
sufficient number of those subject to the testing, such that testing that group 
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I may be misunderstanding Professor Kerr’s complaint 
about my approach to the justification inquiry, but he seems to 
be arguing that one reason ex ante certainty levels should not 
be dispositive of that inquiry is because they make solving 
crime more difficult. That stance ignores the well-accepted 
proposition that protecting privacy and autonomy through 
cause requirements necessitates some sacrifice in law enforce-
ment efficiency.120 It also opens the door wide to allowing the 
government to justify suspicionless or virtually suspicionless 
investigative efforts on easily made (and made-up) assertions 
about crime problems, the need for deterrence, and the difficul-
ty of pursuing its goals in any other way.  
B. CONTEXT 
It is precisely the latter sort of assertion that Professor 
Kerr thinks should be the focus of justification analysis under 
the Fourth Amendment. The correct measure of the benefits 
that derive from a search or seizure is not, he says, the extent 
to which evidence of wrongdoing will be obtained, but rather 
the more capacious inquiry into “how much the technique helps 
the government catch and successfully prosecute bad guys in 
light of how much that successful prosecution deters future 
wrongdoing, incapacitates wrongdoers, and furthers justice.”121 
Elsewhere Professor Kerr states that the proportionality ap-
proach is deficient because it “generally does not factor in how 
much the surveillance solves crime, the seriousness of the 
crimes that it solves, how much it succeeds compared to alter-
natives, and how often it targets guilty suspects instead of in-
nocent ones.”122  
These are all important factors for law enforcement au-
thorities to consider in choosing between constitutionally legi-
timate law enforcement options. But Professor Kerr is in es-
 
of students will actually redress its drug problem.’”); Mich. Dep’t of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1990) (“[T]he choice among such reasonable 
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique un-
derstanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a 
finite number of police officers.”).  
 120. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (“In times of un-
rest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, 
this basic law [requiring probable cause for most searches and seizures] and 
the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. 
But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional 
concepts.”). 
 121. Kerr, supra note 6, at 962. 
 122. Id. at 963. 
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sence arguing that a highly intrusive search (say, of a house) 
should be permitted on less than probable cause if it is a par-
ticularly effective method of solving serious crime and only af-
fects an unspecified number of innocent people. That type of 
argument is a recipe for government dragnets and general 
searches, which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to prevent.123 
Professor Kerr is particularly concerned about the impact 
the imposition of ex ante certainty requirements would have in 
solving serious crime. For instance, he suggests that the cause 
required to search a house for evidence of a minor crime should 
be lower than the cause required to search a house for evidence 
of a planned terrorist attack.124 Based on this example, he con-
cludes that “[t]he government’s interest cannot be measured 
solely by the chances that some evidence will be discovered; any 
measurement must consider the importance of the case and 
how much the evidence will advance that case in light of the al-
ternatives.”125 
On the precise facts of Professor Kerr’s hypothetical, where 
government is trying to prevent a crime rather than solve one, I 
agree with him. In Privacy at Risk, I explicitly recognized a 
“danger exception” to proportionality analysis and devote much 
more attention to it than Professor Kerr suggests in his brief 
footnote on the topic.126 Specifically, the danger exception exists 
when the government is conducting a search to prevent a sig-
nificant imminent harm, such as a terrorist act.127 This ratio-
nale, along with the lesser intrusion idea discussed earlier,128 
explains the holding in Terry v. Ohio, which allowed stops and 
frisks on reasonable suspicion as a crime prevention meas-
ure.129 As I suggest in Privacy at Risk, this rationale might also 
justify some of the government’s more aggressive efforts to pro-
 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
 124. Kerr, supra note 6, at 962–63 (elaborating on this example). 
 125. Id. at 963. 
 126. See id. at 963 n.17. But see SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 26–28, 194, 
293 n.99 (elaborating on the danger exception). 
 127. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 193–95 (discussing the exception in 
the context of terrorism).  
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 13–18 (explaining the balance be-
tween justification and intrusion). 
 129. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968) (“[A] perfectly reasonable ap-
prehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate 
information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecut-
ing him for a crime.”). 
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tect national security130—a discussion Professor Swire seems to 
have missed in indicating that I slight this type of government 
program.131  
There is a big distinction, however, between reducing cer-
tainty requirements because of an imminent danger that needs 
to be prevented and reducing them because a serious crime has 
already been committed. Only in the former situation does a 
true exigency exist. Professor Kerr appears to believe this dis-
tinction is not important, since he repeatedly emphasizes the 
importance of crime seriousness when determining whether a 
particular search or seizure may take place.132 Professor Swire 
may be making the same point with his suggestion that Privacy 
at Risk should have resorted to the vast literature in this coun-
try and in Europe on how proportionality analysis has played 
out in other constitutional contexts.133 This literature can be 
read to require, in the search and seizure context, some as-
sessment of the magnitude of the government’s interest as well 
as the probability that it will be achieved.134 Thus, Professor 
Swire may also believe that investigation of a serious crime, 
outside of the imminent danger context, allows relaxation of 
the ex ante certainty needed to authorize a search or seizure. 
In Privacy at Risk, I explicitly dismissed this type of rea-
soning. First, it ignores Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.135 
In individual cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea 
 
 130. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 194 (“[C]onsistent with the danger excep-
tion described in chapter 2, the showing usually required under proportionali-
ty analysis could be relaxed when the government can demonstrate that the 
data mining is necessary to detect a significant imminent threat [such as ter-
rorist activity].”). 
 131. Swire, supra note 7, at 759 (“Slobogin’s discussion of criminal proce-
dure law does not address the intersection with the growing phenomenon of 
national security searches and seizures.”). 
 132. Kerr, supra note 6, at 962–63. 
 133. Swire, supra note 7, at 760–63 (“When Slobogin omits reference to the 
large literature on the Proportionality Principle, he foregoes a major persua-
sive argument for his proposed reworking of the Fourth Amendment.”). The 
statement in the text is not meant to deny the validity of Swire’s general point 
that greater attention to proportionality literature would have improved the 
book.  
 134. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 
21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 807 (2004) (noting that one version of proportional-
ity analysis “turns on an evaluation of the importance of the objective meas-
ured against its infringing effects on protected rights”). 
 135. When the search or seizure is of a group, rather than of an individual 
suspect, the Court’s analysis is somewhat different. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 147–57. 
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that “the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself 
creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the 
Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search.”136 Second, 
this doctrine is very good policy. A police raid of a home is not 
rendered less intrusive simply because the police are looking 
for evidence of a felony rather than evidence of a misdemea-
nor.137 Professor Kerr’s position (if not Professor Swire’s) is 
analogous to saying that the government’s burden of proof at 
trial should be reduced in murder cases because such cases in-
volve serious crime. 
C. LEGISLATURES V. COURTS 
A third point to consider in discussing the justification side 
of Fourth Amendment analysis is at least obliquely suggested 
by Professor Kerr in the beginning of his review, when he 
states that liberal justices might adopt my approach as a way 
of restoring “what they see as the Court’s rightful place at the 
center of American privacy law.”138 Here he is referring to the 
idea—one that he has vigorously advocated139—that legisla-
tures are much better situated than courts to regulate investig-
ative techniques, especially when, as is the case with physical 
and transaction surveillance, complicated technology is in-
volved. In general, Professor Kerr is correct on this matter. 
That is why I state in several places in Privacy at Risk that the 
courts should abstain from mandating the finer regulatory 
points, but rather should stick to general principles.140  
 
 136. Mincey v. Arizona, 537 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). 
 137. Note, however, that there is some evidence to suggest that where gov-
ernment efforts are viewed as facilitative rather than adversarial, as with 
health and safety inspections, entries into the home are viewed as less intru-
sive. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 30, at 768 (describing evidence 
from the intrusiveness study suggesting that “when the motivation of the 
searchers seems beneficent, the sense of intrusion is lessened”). 
 138. Kerr, supra note 6, at 951.  
 139. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Consti-
tutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (“I 
contend that the legislative branch rather than the judiciary should create the 
primary investigative rules when technology is changing.”). 
 140. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 75–78 (discussing a legislative approach to 
surveillance of the home); id. at 118–19 (discussing “constitutional roadmap-
ping” in which courts lay out basic principles with legislatures filling in the 
details); id. at 201–03 (discussing Kerr’s preference for legislative solutions 
and concluding that, while the courts must provide guidelines, “more detailed 
rule-making along the lines suggested here might best be left to Congress”).  
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But Professor Kerr makes clear in another recent article 
that he does not think the courts should play even the latter 
role with respect to transaction surveillance (and thus probably 
not with respect to public physical surveillance either).141 He 
believes that subconstitutional protections, like subpoena law, 
sufficiently curb wanton abuse of the wide-ranging authority 
the Supreme Court has granted to the government through its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.142 Thus, he is not disturbed 
by the fact that, under existing law, subpoenas can be issued on 
a simple finding of relevance (and sometimes even less) or the 
fact that many types of subpoenas can only be challenged by 
the third-party record-holder, which seldom wants to buck the 
government’s investigative efforts.143  
Whether or not one believes this statutory law is sufficient-
ly protective of privacy interests in personal information, it is 
important to remember that given the Court’s stance that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to transaction surveillance, 
even these minimal limitations are not required.144 As we have 
 
 141. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
561, 596–600 (2009).  
 142. Id. at 596–97 (describing statutory substitutes and declaring it a “good 
thing” that they provide less protection than a warrant).  
 143. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 169–80 (describing current subpoena-
like mechanisms and the minimal extent to which third parties contest them). 
Professor Kerr gives three other reasons for his stance in favor of the Court’s 
current third party doctrine. First, he asserts that regulating transaction sur-
veillance would unfairly disadvantage the government, which before the ad-
vent of the phone, the Internet, and other technology could relatively easily 
figure out with whom we conducted our transactions. Kerr, supra note 141, at 
573–81. Of course technology has also vastly increased the government’s abili-
ty to acquire transactional information; allowing government to acquire this 
information without justification would lead to a serious imbalance in the oth-
er direction. Second, Professor Kerr argues that we consent to revelation of our 
transactional information when we give it to institutional third parties. Id. at 
588–90. That restatement of the Court’s assumption-of-risk rationale blinks 
reality and fails to distinguish between giving information to human third 
parties, who have an autonomy interest in disclosing information, and institu-
tional third parties, which do not. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 156–60. 
Third, Professor Kerr argues that any alternative to the Court’s third party 
doctrine would disproportionately harm law enforcement because it will be too 
onerous or confusing. Kerr, supra note 141, at 581–86. I agree with him to the 
extent we impose the warrant-probable cause template on such searches. One 
of the advantages of the proportionality approach is that it provides more flex-
ibility, because it permits less intrusive searches and seizures, conducted at 
early stages of an investigation, on a lesser showing. Professor Kerr’s state-
ment that “intermediate standards” are “not possible under the Fourth 
Amendment,” id. at 597, is simply not true. 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26 (criticizing the limited pro-
tection under Fourth Amendment precedent). 
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seen with National Security Letters, which permitted FBI 
agents to obtain records without any judicial or prosecutorial 
check, even the limitations that Professor Kerr is willing to 
adopt can disappear at the first moral panic—precisely because 
they are not constitutionally based.145 Courts and the Fourth 
Amendment have to provide a legal backstop against these 
types of circumstances. 
In Privacy at Risk, I did briefly mention one significant ca-
veat to this position, a caveat that might also alleviate some of 
Professor Kerr’s concern about basing justification solely on 
certainty levels. Based on an article by Richard Worf,146 I noted 
that, where searches and seizures of groups are involved—stops 
at roadblocks, school-wide drug testing programs, data mining, 
and public camera surveillance—political-process theory might 
cede authority to the legislature even where no ex ante hit rate 
evidence is adduced.147 I suggested that, so long as the affected 
group has access to the political process (i.e., is not a discreet 
and insular minority) and the authorizing legislation puts suf-
ficient limitations on executive discretion (e.g., requires a 
search of everyone in the group) rationality review might suf-
fice.148  
In a forthcoming work entitled Government Dragnets in a 
Technological Age, I elaborate on this position, again relying 
heavily on Worf ’s work.149 I acknowledge that legislation, 
which avoids the process flaws of disparate treatment and 
overdelegation, deserves deference for two reasons. First, the 
group affected has had an opportunity to influence the law. 
Second, legislative bodies are better at figuring out the welfare-
maximization questions that arise in determining the deterrent 
and detection effects of group searches and seizures and alter-
native methods of controlling crime.150 At the same time, as po-
 
 145. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 177–79 (describing abuses of National 
Security Letters). Cindy Cohn has said that National Security Letters should 
simply be called “letters” because they are often used to obtain information 
having nothing to do with national security. Cindy Cohn, Legal Dir., Elec. 
Frontier Found., Panel at the DePaul Law School Conference: Cyberlaw 2.0: 
Legal Challenges of an Evolving Internet (Oct. 15, 2009). 
 146. Worf, supra note 10, at 119–31 (arguing for deference to legislatures 
in this area). 
 147. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 43.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets in a Technological Age, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24–28, on file 
with author). 
 150. Id. Note also that the primary method of avoiding overdelegation is to 
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litical-process theory dictates, group searches and seizures that 
are not authorized by legislation or that are authorized by leg-
islation that is tainted by process flaws should still be subject 
to strict scrutiny by the courts. I define this scrutiny solely in 
proportionality/compelling-state-interest terms, without the 
necessity component that usually accompanies strict scrutiny 
analysis, not only because proportionality reasoning is focused 
solely on ex ante certainty levels but because, as Kerr suggests, 
courts are not good at carrying out the necessity calculus in the 
criminal context.151  
Applying this reasoning to cases the Court has confronted, 
I conclude in Government Dragnets that although some of the 
group search and seizures the Court has approved (and one it 
did not)152 should have been approved, many other programs 
the Court has sanctioned were defective because they were es-
tablished either by an executive entity or by legislation that did 
not impose any meaningful limitations on law enforcement.153 
Also subject to strict judicial scrutiny would be data mining 
programs that allow the government to sweep through thou-
sands or millions of records based on vague legislative pro-
nouncements, and public camera systems established at the 
behest of law enforcement agencies rather than municipal gov-
ernment. Because they are the products of a defective political 
process, courts should prohibit such investigative techniques 
unless there is a demonstration of the hit rates required by 
proportionality analysis.154  
Most importantly for purposes of responding to Professor 
Kerr’s critique, investigative techniques that are not aimed at 
promoting searches and seizures of groups with political access, 
 
ensure the program applies to all constituents, powerful and disadvantaged 
alike, which should have an inhibiting effect on casual passage of dragnet pro-
grams. See Slobogin, Data Mining, supra note 30, at 317–38 (describing the 
near unanimous congressional vote, only two years after 9/11, scaling back the 
Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness program).  
 151. Slobogin, supra note 149 (manuscript at 30–37).  
 152. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (striking down a Georgia 
statute that required drug testing of all political candidates). 
 153. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) (drug-
testing program established by local police); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000) (roadblock policy promulgated by the local police de-
partment); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (same); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 608–13 (1989) (drug-
testing policy promulgated under statute permitting Secretary of Transporta-
tion to “prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and 
standards for all areas of railroad safety”).  
 154. See Slobogin, supra note 149 (manuscript at 30–37).  
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but rather merely facilitate investigation of individuals sus-
pected of crimes, should always be subject to proportionality 
analysis. That would mean that Professor Kerr’s preferred leg-
islation permitting law enforcement access to a suspect’s bank 
or phone records based on a subpoena would not be entitled to 
rationality review. Rather, they should be analyzed under the 
proportionality principle.155  
Contrary to Professor Kerr’s suggestion, unless political-
process theory counsels judicial deference, the mere fact that 
legislatures are relatively competent at collecting information 
about technological surveillance (or any other investigative 
technique) should not immunize their products from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Courts may be relatively poor at constructing 
complicated legal rules and institutionally ill-equipped to de-
cide how much deterrence is bought with various types of tech-
niques, but they routinely make proportionality assessments in 
search and seizure contexts.156 The judiciary is perfectly compe-
tent at determining whether the other branches of government 
have come up with the evidence demanded by the proportional-
ity principle in those situations where it applies.157  
  CONCLUSION   
Professor Kerr implies throughout his review that the ap-
proach advocated in Privacy at Risk would be much more ap-
pealing to a liberal court than a conservative one because of its 
insistence that the Fourth Amendment have some impact on 
surveillance techniques.158 I am not so sure. Since a proportio-
nality approach would not require probable cause or even rea-
sonable suspicion for minimally intrusive techniques such as 
brief use of overt public camera surveillance or many types of 
transaction surveillance, many card-carrying ACLU members 
may find much to be upset about in my proposals. At the same 
time, even the “conservative” Justice Scalia has bemoaned in-
trusive government techniques, like drug testing, that are not 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (noting that 
Fourth Amendment analysis requires balancing: “On one side of the balance 
are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal 
security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal 
with breaches of public order.”). 
 157. As Professor Faigman notes, “[w]hile the judiciary may not be as well 
designed institutionally as the legislative branch to gather . . . data, courts are 
especially well designed to evaluate them.” FAIGMAN, supra note 9, at 133. 
 158. Kerr, supra note 6, at 951, 964 (referring to a future, liberal Court). 
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justified on some concrete basis.159 In the original intrusiveness 
study that I conducted with Joseph Schumacher, we asked par-
ticipants to indicate where they would place themselves on a 
due process/crime-control spectrum and found that this desig-
nation did not have a significant correlation with intrusiveness 
ratings.160 Conservatives as well as liberals are bothered by 
government intrusions into their privacy. 
The moderate approach represented by the proportionality 
principle has several advantages. As I explained in Privacy at 
Risk, the principle “ameliorate[s] the pressure created by the 
probable-cause-forever stance without sacrificing the core pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment.”161 Aware that declaring a 
government action a search would no longer require that prob-
able cause be demonstrated, courts would be more willing to 
broaden the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Instead of resort-
ing to vacuous “assumption of risk” analysis (Professor Kerr’s 
“probabilistic model”), they would be more receptive to analyz-
ing search and seizure cases in the terms Katz has always stood 
for: expectations of privacy that society has recognized as rea-
sonable. Along with political-process theory, the proportionality 
principle would also inhibit suspicionless searches and seizures 
of groups and thus more effectively counteract pressure, par-
ticularly strong since 9/11, to engage in blanket surveillance 
and other dragnet techniques. But with these caveats, prelimi-
nary investigative techniques, including some types of drag-
nets, could take place in the absence of probable cause, and 
perhaps even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. To con-
clude with the same language that ended Privacy at Risk: “It is 
possible to achieve security in our houses, person, papers, and 
effects from both overweening government officials and those 
who wish to do us harm.”162 
 
 
 
 159. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
681 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion in the present case, 
however, will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will 
be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees.”). 
 160. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 30, at 772–74 (“[C]ontrary to our 
hypothesis, perceptions of intrusiveness and crime control attitudes were not 
significantly related.”). 
 161. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 210. 
 162. Id. at 218. 
